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People are poor because they lack of entitlement on absolute minimum necessities of life. 
Absolute minimum necessities of life include food, education, clothing, housing and health. The 
level of entitlement on basic necessities of a household depends on the level of the current 
income and endowment of that household. The level of income and endowment of a household 
depend on the availability of the employment opportunities for the adult members of that 
household. Since the availability of suitable jobs and agricultural land is scarce in a country like 
Bangladesh, under such a scenario, the creation of self employment opportunities becomes the 
most important objective of households to enhance income, and thus, to enhance the entitlement 
on basic necessities. But the poor households do not have the amount of capital that is required 
for starting up a self employment activity.  
 
It is often argued that the formal financial sector and informal financial sector in developing 
countries have failed to serve the poorer section of the community. Collateral, credit rationing, 
preference for high income clients and large loans, and bureaucratic and lengthy procedures of 
providing loan in the formal sector keep poor people outside the boundary of the formal sector 
financial institutions in developing countries. On the other hand, the informal financial sector has 
also failed to help the poor. Monopolistic power, excessive higher interest rates, and exploitation 
through under valuation of collaterals and high interest rates have restricted the informal 
financial sector to providing credit to poor people for income generating and poverty alleviation 
purposes [Bhaduri, (1983), Rao, (1980), Bardhan, (1980), Ghosh, (1986), Ghat et. al., (1992].  
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financial services, especially credit, encouraged the micro-credit program to evolve. The micro-
credit program was initiated with the objective of providing poor people with credit without 
collateral. The harmony among group members, the strict discipline in providing credit and 
collecting repayments, and supervision of borrower’s activities in the micro-credit system 
replaced the provision of collateral, which is very important in receiving credit from the formal 
financial sector institutions. The Grameen Bank has been established with the objective of 
alleviating poverty of the poor people through providing them with microcredit for starting up 
income generating activities. It is, therefore, important to evaluate the poverty alleviation 
capacity of the microcredit program of the Grameen Bank. The weekly total food consumption 
expenditures have been used as a proxy of the poverty status of a household. The poverty status 
of a household is determined on the basis of a poverty line. Again, the poverty line is estimated 
on the basis of the total food consumption expenditures that are required for an adult person to 
maintain the essential minimum intake of 2200 calories and 50 grams of proteins. Since the 
calculation of the poverty line is difficult and there is no such an up-to-date poverty line 
available for the sample survey area, I have decided to use the total amount of weekly food 
consumption expenditures as an indirect measure of poverty in this paper.  
 
The present paper is intended to analyze how effective micro-credit programs are in increasing 
consumption of borrowing households. A quasi-experimental design has been formulated to 
achieve this objective. The survey design covers one group of households, which have already 
received more than one loan from the micro-credit program of the Grameen bank (these 
households are known as program households in this study) and another group of households, 
who just have joined the program or received their first loan (these households are known as 
comparison households). This paper compares consumption of program households with that of 
comparison households to assess the impact of microcredit on consumption of borrowing 
households. The study expects the better status of program households in terms of consumption 
compared to that of comparison households.  
 
This paper is divided into seven sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section 
introduces the Grameen Bank. The third section presents the literature review. In the fourth, the 
estimation strategy and a description of two important biases related to the impact assessment 
and how the present study has avoided those two biases are presented. The fifth section describes 
the survey design of this study. In the sixth, impact of micro-credit on consumption is discussed. 
Finally, the conclusion of the paper is presented.  
 
 
2. Microcredit and the Grameen Bank 
 
Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, was a professor of economics at the 
University of Chittagong in Bangladesh until the end of nineteen seventies. He was also the 
director of the rural research program of that university. While he was teaching at Chittagong 
University, he found massive poverty among people living in villages surrounding the university. 
As part of the rural research program Professor Muhammad Yunus undertook a research project 
in 1976 to identify causes and extent of poverty of these poor people. He found some poor 
women who were forced to sell their handicraft products to middlemen at prices that were much 
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middlemen on credit. Then Professor Yunus tried to estimate the amount of capital, which was 
required by those poor people to buy the required raw materials to produce the handicraft 
products. Professor Yunus, to his surprise, found that forty-two poor women lacked a capital 
amounting to a total of only Tk. 856 ($21). Out of these forty-two poor women some required as 
little capital as only Taka 10 or 20 and the highest amount required was Taka 65 [Counts, (1996), 
Yunus (1998)]. Professor Yunus thus realized that the lack of required capital, to continue or 
start income generating activities in rural areas, was the root cause of poverty. He provided those 
forty-two poor women, who lacked the required capital amount of Tk. 856, from his own pocket. 
After that, he started contacting and pursuing the formal sector commercial banks to provide 
these poor people the required amount of capital to continue or start production of handicraft 
products. Initially, formal sector commercial banks refused to provide credit to these poor 
people, because these poor people did not have the required collateral to provide against loans. 
Formal commercial banks also argued that the proposed loans to those poor women were so tiny 
that interest income from those loans would not cover administrative costs of loans. In response 
to the questions raised by the executives of the formal sector commercial banks about the 
required collateral to receive loans Professor Yunus offered himself as a guarantor of those 
loans.  
 
From that arrangement the Grameen Bank began its difficult journey to achieve a great objective, 
poverty free Bangladesh and in global perspective, a poverty free world. Professor Yunus and his 
colleagues have devised a unique technology to provide small credit to poor people without 
collateral, which is now known as Grameen Bank model and the small loans, provided to poor 
people, are known as microcredit.  
 
In 1983, the Grameen Bank became a specialized formal sector financial institution through a 
government statute. It is now regulated by the central bank of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Bank, 
like other formal sector financial institutions. A 13-member board of Directors administers the 
Grameen Bank. This 13-member board consists of nine poor Grameen Bank borrowers, three 
government officials and Professor Yunus as the Managing Director of the bank. Currently, 
ninety-two percent of the Grameen Bank shares are owned by the Grameen Bank borrowers and 
eight percent owned by the Bangladesh government. The Grameen Bank collects fund from 
member savings, foreign lenders and own sources. The foreign lenders contribute three percent 
and the members’ savings contribute approximately seventy five percent of the available funds. 
The other sources and own fund of the Grameen Bank contribute the remaining twenty two 
percent of the available funds. 
 
2.1 Group Approach in Credit disbursement 
 
The Grameen Bank follows the group approach in providing collateral free loans to poor people. 
Five people, with similar socio-economic status and from the same village, form a group and 
they elect one person among themselves as the chairperson of the group. After formation of the 
group, they are required to participate in a training program for a period of at least seven days. 
During the training program, group members learn thoroughly the rules and regulations of the 
Grameen Bank which involve, for example, understanding the purpose of bank procedures, 
knowing in detail the responsibilities of the group chairperson and the centre chief, explaining 
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to write their signatures. After completion of the training, group members are eligible for their 
first loan and they request the local Grameen Bank branch to provide them with loans. A field 
officer of the branch visits the houses of the group members and assesses their socio-economic 
status and their loan requirement. Each member of the group provides himself as a guarantor of 
other members’ loans and this procedure is known as joint liability system. Joint liability of 
group members replaces the collateral requirement of formal financial sector loans.  
 
At first, only two members from the group are allowed to apply for a loan. Next two more 
members are allowed to apply, if the field officer finds loan repayment of first two members 
satisfactory.  Subsequently, the fifth member receives loan on the basis of the loan repayment 
performance of four other members of the group. All loan decisions, loan applications 
processing, loan recovery, and savings collection are made during the weekly meeting of the 
centre
2. A field officer of the Grameen Bank branch attends the weekly meeting of the centre as 
the representative of the bank. The sanctioned loans to group members are to be repaid in weekly 
installments and each installment is equivalent to two percent of the principal amount of the loan. 
The weekly repayment system keeps installment repayments so small that even a poor person 
should be able to manage it without any big trouble. If any member defaults the whole group 
becomes ineligible to receive additional loans. Each member of the group is responsible and 
liable for other members’ repayment of loans. Joint liability motivates group members to ensure 
each other’s repayments. This procedure of providing credit to a group instead of an individual is 
known as group lending technique. Group members select their own investment activities and 
the field officers of the Grameen Bank supervise these investment activities of group members 
[Chowdhury and Akhand (1993)].   
 
Group lending technique with joint liability system provides the Grameen Bank defense against 
the problems arising from asymmetric and imperfect enforcement. It helps to minimize risk 
arising from adverse selection problems. It also assists to build up efficient communication 
between program borrowers and bank workers. In addition, group lending creates a support 
system for members who may not be able to pay at one time or another. It serves as a screening 
device for the Grameen Bank to select good borrower from potential eligible borrowers. Stiglitz 
(1990) argues that those, whose investments will not produce enough return to repay the loan, 
should be screened out by their peers at the entry point. Ito (1999) argues that group lending with 
joint liability system is the main factor behind the Grameen Bank’s impressive financial 
performance, especially loan recovery.  
 
2.2 Grameen Bank II 
 
The microfinance institutions are vulnerable to natural disaster risk. Immediately after a natural 
disaster, the recovery rate of MFIs goes down drastically. And sometimes this declining trend in 
the recovery rate creates a huge financial crisis for the MFIs. The Grameen Bank faced a similar 
problem in 1998. The recovery rate went down drastically immediately after the floods of 1998. 
Half of Bangladesh was under water for a period of ten weeks. The borrowers of the Grameen 
Bank lost most of their belongings, like other Bangladeshis, in the flood. As part of the 
                                                 
2 Centre is a separate stage between the group and the branch of Grameen Bank. The centre comprises members of 5 
to 8 groups. A Grameen Bank branch has 50 to 60 centres and maximum number of 2400 members. 
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the accumulated loans became burdensome for the borrowers. And it also became very difficult 
for them to repay the weekly installments as the size of the weekly installment payment 
exceeded their ability to repay. As a result the borrowers started defaulting on the repayments of 
their installments. When this repayment problem had became very severe, the management of 
the Grameen Bank took the initiative of redesigning the microcredit methodology to help the 
borrowers who had the repayment problem. The Grameen Bank named the redesigned 
microcredit methodology as “the Grameen Generalised System (GGS)” [Yunus (2002)]. In the 
microfinance world, the Grameen Bank with the new microcredit methodology, the Grameen 
Generalised System (GGS), is known as the Grameen Bank II.  
 
The Grameen Generalized System (GGS) has been devised to manage the prime loan product, 
Basic Loan, of the Grameen Bank. Apart from this loan product, the Grameen Bank has also two 
other loan products: (1) the housing loan, and (2) the higher education loan. These additional two 
loan products continue parallel to the basic loan. Under GGS a borrower gets the basic loan and 
keeps on receiving the loan cycle after cycle without any interruption until she drops out herself 
from the program or defaults. The borrower has the opportunity to upgrade the loan size at each 
cycle of the loan. Professor Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, labels this as the 
“Grameen micro-credit highway” [Yuns, (2002)]. If the borrower defaults, GGS gives her an exit 
option.  Under the exit option, the Grameen Bank offers her a new loan which is called as 
“flexible loan”. The flexible loan is basically a rescheduled loan of the defaulted basic loan with 
a new set of terms and conditions. Under the flexible loan, the repayment schedule is designed 
on the basis of the repayment capacity of the borrower. When a borrower defaults, she has to exit 
from the Grameen microcredit highway. But the defaulted borrower has the right to get back to 
the Grameen microcredit highway after repaying the flexible loan that was issued to her 
immediately after her default on the basic loan. When the borrower gets back to the Grameen 
microcredit highway, she requires to starting her journey on the Grameen microcredit highway 
from the beginning. When a borrower defaults, i.e. takes an exit from the Grameen microcredit 
highway, the Grameen Bank needs to keep 50% provision against the amount given under the 
flexible loan to the defaulted borrower.  Any amount of the flexible loan that is not repaid back 
by the borrower within two years of the issuance of the flexible loan is regarded as overdue, and 
the Grameen Bank keeps 100% provision on that amount. The amount of the flexible loan that is 
not repaid back by the borrower within two years is regarded as bad debts, and it is written off 
completely from the balance sheet of the organization. 
 
Under GGS, the Grameen Bank has dismantled the savings scheme called “Group Fund”. 
Earlier, the members of a group jointly required saving some money in the group fund and they 
were not allowed to withdraw their savings from the group fund. Currently, under the GGS, 
borrowers require opening three obligatory savings accounts independently: (1) Personal Savings 
Account, (2) Special Savings Account, and (3) Pension Deposit Account. The Grameen Bank 
makes a deduction at source of an amount of five percent of the loan amount at the time of the 
disbursement of a loan. Out of this five percent, half of the amount goes to the personal savings 
account, and remaining half goes to the special savings account. The borrowers also deposit their 
weekly savings in the personal savings account and they are allowed to withdraw any amount 
from the account at any time. On the other hand, the borrowers are not allowed to withdraw their 
savings from the special savings account for the first three years.   After the first three years, the 
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2000 or half of the balance in the account, whichever is larger. For the borrowers who receive 
loans more than Tk. 8000, it is mandatory for them to save Tk. 50 per month in the pension 
deposit account. After ten years of savings, they receive an amount which is almost double of the 
amount they deposit in the account during the period of 120 months [Yunus, (2002), and 




During the period of 1986 to 2005, the Grameen Bank had achieved a growth rate of twenty five 
percent per annum in cumulative disbursement of all loans (table 1). In 1986, the cumulative 
disbursement of all loans was $57 million. It went up to $5,026 million in 2005. The yearly 
disbursement of loans was $18 million in 1986 and it increased to $609 million in 2005 with a 
growth rate of 19 percent per year. The Grameen Bank helped its members to construct six 
hundred twenty seven thousand houses by 2005 through providing them with housing loans. In 
1985, the total amount of member deposits was $4 million and it increased to $481 million in 
2005. During this period, the total deposits of members had attained a growth rate of twenty 
seven percent. The total number of members of the Grameen bank was 5.6 million in 2005, but 
the same membership size was only 0.23 million in 1986. The growth rate in the total number of 
members was seven percent per year during the period of 1986 to 2005. The microcredit program 
of the Grameen Bank covers more than half of the area of the country. Currently, it covers sixty 
thousand villages out of eighty six thousand villages in the country. But it had coverage of only 
six percent of the whole country in 1986. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of micro-credit on poverty and different aspects of 
wellbeing is very mixed [see for example, Chowdhury et. al. (2005), Chowdhury (2000), 
Coleman (1999), Morduch, (1999), Schrieder and Sharma, (1999), Edgecomb and Barton, 
(1998), Hussain (eds.) (1998), Bruntrup et. al. (1997), Chowdhury and Khandker (1996), 
Mustafa, et. al. (1996), Khandker and Chowdhury (1996), Pitt and Khandker (1996), Sebstad and 
Chen, (1996),   Proshika (1995), Hossain (1988), Hossain (1984)]. Some impact evaluation 
studies have found that the access to credit by the poor has a positive, large and permanent effect 
on living standards. However, other studies have found that the living standards have not 
improved through microcredit, rather poor households simply become poorer through the 
additional burden of (further) debt. Since more money for micro-credit essentially means less 
money for other programs with similar aims.  
 
Some studies, for example, Bruntrup et al. (1997), have only used descriptive statistics for 
analysis. They have not used any multivariate technique to determine the impact of microcredit 
on poverty and poverty related aspects of borrowing households. Some studies, for example, 
Mustafa, et. al. (1996), Hossain (1984), were biased in selecting the sample households. These 
two studies selected additional 200 so-called ‘success households’ non-randomly for data 
collection. None of them have used the complete framework, which covers all aspects of 
poverty, for assessment of the impact of microcredit on poverty. Among the studies reviewed, 
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et al. (2005) were to be found more sound from the methodological perspective.  
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
 
Given the extensive geographic coverage of microcredit in Bangladesh it is difficult to find out a 
perfect ‘control’ group that could be used to estimate the impact of microcredit on consumption 
of households. The choice of a household to attend a microcredit program is likely to be related 
to the outcomes of interest i.e. consumption in this paper. Given the outcome for household i, I 
estimate the following equation: 
 
( 1 )      Y i = β
’xi + γMC + ui  
 
where x is a vector of some control variables that I assume to be exogenous (for example, 
education of the household members, distance of the household from the nearest market, etc.), 
and MC represents the microcredit program participation, and ui is the error term. 
 
The participation in the microcredit programs is defined by the equation given below: 
 
(2)       MC  =  δ
’xi + νi 
 
Where xi represent some control variables and νi represent the error term of the model. While the 
impact of MC is estimated using the equation (1), it is assumed that the error terms of equations 
(1) and (2), i.e. ui and νi, are not correlated. But, these two error terms become correlated, if the 
characteristics of the households that influence the microcredit program participation decision 
also determine the outcome variable, i.e. Yi in equation (1). This problem is known as the 
selection bias problem. In such a situation, the OLS estimation of equation (1) yields a biased 
estimate of the parameter of interest γ. Two types of selection biases make ui and νi correlated: 
(1) non-random selection of households to participate in microfinance program, and (2) non-
random selection of places to establish branches of microfinance institutions.  
 
The microfinance institutions in Bangladesh accept those people as members who have less than 
50 decimal of land. This selection criteria generates the first type of two types biases that I have 
mentioned above. Besides the selection criteria of MFIs, the self-selection of program 
participants is also another source of the first bias. Since it is expected that households with 
greater entrepreneurial capability are more likely to join the program, this may also bias the 
econometric estimation of program benefits. The non-random program placement also creates 
biases in estimating benefits of the program. For example, if microcredit programs are 
implemented in those areas which have more business opportunities or have better 
communication infrastructure or have more dynamic leaders or are poorer, then such criteria for 
selecting places for program implementation create biases in estimating program benefits. 
 
On the basis of the above arguments, we can say that a comparison between a group of program 
participants, who are self selected, and a group of non-participants, who are not self-selected, 
would generate a bias in estimating the impact of microcredit on outcome variables. In the same 
way, the estimates will be biased if program group members are selected from a place that has 
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members from a place without those characteristics. On the basis of the above understanding; the 
present study uses an alternative survey method (Coleman,1999; Chowdhury, 2000) than is 
commonly employed. We selected new members from a newly established branch as well as old 
branches of MFIs, who were yet to receive or just received the first loan, as members of the 
control group. Since, the comparison group members are also self-selected like the program 
members, the bias arising from self-selection in estimating program benefits disappears. The 
MFIs select all their areas of operation non-randomly according to their own criteria. Thus, in 
our investigation, both the program branch and the comparison branch have been selected under 
similar criteria. Therefore, the bias, which arises from non-random program placement, is also 
avoided from our sample. Now, the program impacts can be estimated through using a single 
equation: 
 
(3)      ij y ij y j y ij ij M L H Y ν β θ α + + + =  
 
where, Yij, Hij, and Mj, are defined as above; and Vi represents the error of the model that arises 
from the household and village level variables that are not included in the model. In the equation 
3, Mij, the vector of microcredit variables, includes two variables: Dij is  the duration (in months) 
of the membership of the household j in the village i in the Grameen Bank’s microcredit 
program; and Lj is a dummy variable coded “1” if the household is a new member and it has not 
received any microcredit loans and coded “0” otherwise.  This model has been estimated using 
two specifications of microcredit variables. The first specification is a simple linear 
specification: 
 
(4)      2 1 φ φ ij j ij D L M + =  
 
The second is a quadratic specification: 
 
(5)        3
2
2 1 φ φ φ ij ij j ij D D L M + + =
 
The second specification has been designed to see the non-linearity in the impact of microcredit 
on different outcome variables. The microcredit variable Lij has been included to control the 
characteristics that have contributed new members, yet to receive any microcredit, to join after 
those members, who have already received microcredit. We believe that these ‘new members 
without loan’ and ‘old members’ are systematically different in terms of those factors that 
contributed one group to join the microcredit program before the other group.  
 
The other variables that are included in the regression models are given in the table 2 along with 
mean and standard deviations those variables. The variables included in the vector of household 
characteristics (Hij) are religion, land ownership, education and the demographic composition of 
the household. The variables included in the vector of village-level characteristics (Lij) are the 
presence of a primary school, a secondary school, a tube well and electricity in the village, along 
with the distance to the nearest market, paved road, commercial bank, district headquarters and 
Dhaka.  
 
  95. The Data 
 
Four-stage random sampling technique has been applied in selecting program households and 
comparison households. In the first stage, one district had been randomly selected out of 64 
districts in Bangladesh. In the second stage of random sampling, three branches of Grameen 
Bank, two branches for selecting program households and the other one for selecting comparison 
households, had been selected randomly for data collection purpose. Program households had 
been selected from two more than eight years old branches (program branch) of the Grameen 
Bank and comparison households had been selected from a newly established Grameen Bank 
branch (comparison branch). In the third stage, we randomly selected thirty centres
3 from the 
comparison branch and sixty centers from two program branches. In the fourth and final stage, 
the study randomly selected six members from each of the program branch centre and seven 
members from each of the comparison branch centre.  
 
In total, the study collected information from two hundred and ten member households of the 
comparison branch and from three hundred and sixty member households of program branches. 
However, during the examination of the filled in questionnaires of comparison households, it 
was found that some questionnaires contained illogical as well as incomplete answers. The study 
dropped these questionnaires. This left the study with two hundred and five useable 
questionnaires from the comparison branch and three hundred and sixteen usable questionnaires 
from two program branches usable. 
 
Besides information on microcredit and consumption, the survey collected detailed information 
on a variety of factors. For example, demographic information (age, sex, marital status, etc.) and 
socio-economic information (education, employment, food consumption, expenditure on health, 
etc.) were collected for all household members. Detailed village-level information was also 
collected, such as distance to nearest primary school, secondary school, market and district 
headquarters, along with variables describing village infrastructure, such as the presence of 
schools, markets, roads, electricity, etc. Information relating to the size of loan received, date of 





The weekly total household food consumption expenditures are composed of the sum of the total 
market value of food purchases, value of consumption out of home produce, and all current 
transfers and benefits, either cash or kind. It is expected that the total value of consumption 
expenditures is correlated to the size of the household. For this reason, the total amount of 
consumption expenditures, the dependent variable in equation (3), has been deflated by the size 
of the household. In a household all the members do not belong to the same age group. The level 
of consumption of household members varies with the age. For this reason, all members in a 
household have been converted into equivalent adults through using an equivalence scale (age 0-
17=0.5, and age 18 and above = 1), and finally, the total amount of per equivalent adult food 
                                                 
3 Each Grameen Bank branch consists of 50-60 centres, each centre consists of 8 groups and each group consists of 
5 members.  
  10consumption expenditures of a household has been calculated through dividing weekly total food 
consumption expenditures by the number of equivalent adults. 
 
Table 3 shows the average per equivalent adult consumption expenditures of old microcredit 
member households and new microcredit member households of the Grameen Bank. The 
average consumption of the households in the comparison group is Taka one hundred and forty 
seven. On the other hand, the same consumption is Taka one hundred and seventy five for the 
households in the program group. The program households on an average consume nineteen 
percent higher compared to comparison households and it is statistically significant. This result 
illustrates that the participation of a household in the microcredit program of the Grameen Bank 
for a longer period increases consumption of that household. 
 
The key coefficients of the estimated equations are summarized in Table 4. The dependent 
variable is total weekly per equivalent adult consumption. The natural log of this variable is 
taken and a log-lin relationship is established with the majority of the equation. This non-linear 
relationship exhibits the following property: a one-unit change in x will create a percent change 
in y. This functional form is also adopted because the natural log helps to avoid problems with 
heteroskedasticity by minimizing the variance across the sample. The coefficients of the 
microcredit variables in the linear specifications are given in column (1).  The same coefficients 
of the quadratic specification are given in column (2). The coefficients of the microcredit 
program duration dummies are presented in column (3). In all the models, the variable “L” is not 
statistically significant at the conventionally acceptable level. It indicates that the selection bias 
problem is not a problem in estimating the impact of microcredit program participation on 
consumption. The results of the estimation of the linear model indicate that the participation of a 
household in the microcredit program of the Grameen bank increases the level of consumption of 
that household. An increase in the membership duration by one year increases the level of 
consumption by one and half percent. The results of the quadratic specification also suggest that 
microcredit program participation increases consumption of a household at a declining rate. The 
results from the estimation of the model with microcredit program duration dummies suggest 
that the consumption level goes up gradually with the increase in the membership duration up to 




This paper tries to assess the impact of the participation of a household in the microcredit 
program of the Grameen Bank on consumption. Considering the endogeneity in the microcredit 
program participation of households, the study has made a comparison between new member 
households and old member households to assess the impact of microcredit program 
participation on consumption of households. The results indicate that old member households 
consume nineteen percent higher compared to new member households. The results also indicate 
that the microcredit program participation significantly positively increases the level of 
consumption of participating household. An additional year of membership in the microcredit 
program of the Grameen Bank increases on an average the level of consumption of participating 
households by one and half percent. The increasing trend in the level of consumption of 
participating households continues up to five years of membership. The growth in the 
consumption of households starts showing a declining trend after five years of membership. On 
  11the basis of the estimated results, it can be said that the participation in the microcredit program 
of the Grameen Bank increases the consumption level of participating households. 
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Table 1: Performance of the Grameen Bank 
 








Cumulative Disbursement (All Loans, in $ million)  56.51  248.08  3,060.44  5,025.61
Disbursement During the Year (All Loans, in $ million)  18.18  68.73  268.44  608.79 
Year-end Outstanding Amount (All Loans, in $ million)  10.09  38.60  193.26  415.82 
Housing Loan Disbursement During the Year (in $ million) 0.19  6.82  1.41  2.95 
Number of Houses Built Cumulative  2,042  91,157  533,041  627,058
Total Deposits (Balance, in $ million)  4.10  25.86  126.78  481.22 
Number of Members (million)  0.23  0.87  2.38  5.58 
Percentage of Female Members  74  91  95  96 
Number of Villages covered  5,170  19,536  40,225  59,912 
Number of Branches  295  781  1,160  1,735 
Profit/Loss (For the Year, in $ million)  0.00  0.00  0.21  15.21 
 
  14Table 2: Variables used in analysis 
 
Variable   Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
conspea  Total Weekly Per Equivalent Adult Consumption (in Taka)  164.01  90.10 
nw  Total Net Worth of the Household (HH) (in Taka)  161,212  139,369 
L  New HHs that haven’t received any microcredit yet (Dummy)   0.03  0.18 
D  Membership Duration in the Microcredit Program  43.22  37.25 
D7-12  Membership Duration 7 months to 12 months (Dummy)  0.19  0.39 
D13-24  Membership Duration 13 months to 24 months (Dummy)  0.10  0.31 
D25-36  Membership Duration 25 months to 36 months (Dummy)  0.02  0.16 
D37-48  Membership Duration 37 months to 48 months (Dummy)  0.02  0.14 
D49-60  Membership Duration 49 months to 60 months (Dummy)  0.03  0.17 
D61-72  Membership Duration 61 months to 72 months (Dummy)  0.10  0.30 
D73-84  Membership Duration 73 months to 84 months (Dummy)  0.11  0.30 
D85-96  Membership Duration 85 months to 96 months (Dummy)  0.17  0.38 
D97-108  Membership Duration 97 months to 108 months (Dummy)  0.05  0.22 
reli   Religion (Dummy)  0.92  0.30 
land   Total Area of Agricultural Land (Decimal)   25.40  42.95 
edumxm   The maximum schooling years of a male member in the HH  5.64  4.08 
edumxf   The maximum schooling years of a female member in the HH  4.46  3.52 
tfm5t15   Total female members in the age category of 5 to 15  0.93  0.99 
tmm5t15   Total male members in the age category of 5 to 15  0.99  0.97 
tfm16t24   Total female members in the age category of 16 to 24  0.36  0.59 
tmm16t24   Total male members in the age category of 16 to 24  0.47  0.73 
tfm25t40   Total female members in the age category of 25 to 40  0.65  0.49 
tmm25t40   Total male members in the age category of 25 to 40  0.62  0.58 
tfm41t60   Total female members in the age category of 41 to 60  0.22  0.42 
tmm40t59   Total male members in the age category of 41 to 60  0.46  0.50 
tfm60a   Total female members in the age category of 61 and above  0.05  0.23 
tmm60a   Total male members in the age category of 61 and above  0.08  0.27 
mark   Existence of a market in the village (Dummy)  0.39  0.49 
Metroad   Existence of a metal road in the village (Dummy)  0.44  0.51 
psch   Existence of a primary school in the village (Dummy)  0.79  0.41 
ssch   Existence of a secondary school in the village (Dummy)  0.26  0.44 
elec   Existence of the electricity in the village (Dummy)  0.79  0.41 
dtw   Existence of a deep tube well in the village (Dummy)  0.59  0.49 
dmark   Distance of the household from the nearest market (in km)   0.74  0.67 
dmetroad   Distance of the household from the nearest metal road (in km)  0.65  0.68 
dbank   Distance of the household from the nearest bank branch (in km)  1.23  0.93 
ddhq   Distance of the household from the district headquarters (in km)  14.83  14.11 
ddhaka   Distance of the household from the capital city Dhaka (in km)  43.09  20.79 
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Table 3: Weekly Per Equivalent Adult Consumption 
 
Group  Obs  Mean  Std. Err.  Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Old Members  313  174.93  5.41  95.65  164.30  185.57 
New Members  206  147.40  5.46  78.31  136.65  158.16 
combined 519  164.00  3.96  90.10  156.24  171.78 
diff   27.53  8.00    11.82  43.25 
T test 
diff =mean(Old Members) - mean(New Members)                                                                  t  =   3.4415
Ho: diff = 0                                                                                                     degrees of freedom =      517
Ha: diff < 0                                                    Ha: diff != 0                                                        Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9997                                  Pr(T > t) = 0.0006                                            Pr(T > t) = 0.0003 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Log Weekly Per Equivalent Adult Consumption 
 
Log Weekly Per Equivalent Adult Consumption 
(1) (2)  (3) 
Duration 
Specification 
Linear quadratic  Dummies 
L  0.0181 [0.17]  0.0567 [0.53]  - 
D  0.0013 [2.14]  0.0054 [2.02]  - 
D
2  - -0.00004  [1.58]  - 
D7-12 -  -  0.0708  [1.18] 
D13-24 -  -  0.0296  [0.39] 
D25-36 -  -  0.0295  [0.23] 
D37-48 -  -  0.1087  [0.83] 
D49-60 -  -  0.2172  [1.91] 
D61-72 -  -  0.1916  [2.53] 
D73-84 -  -  0.1762  [2.33] 
D85-96 -  -  0.0829  [1.25] 
D97-108 -  -  0.1154  [1.16] 
 
Notes: Ratio of coefficient to its standard error shown in brackets. Equations also include control 
variables shown in Table 2 but coefficients are not reported. The complete set of estimates is 
available from the author on request. 